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A B S T R A C T   
This paper contributes by showing simultaneously the interlinked challenges of sustainability-based (based on 
long-term economic, social and environmental targets) executive remuneration and the problems of transparency 
in remuneration reporting. Our empirical data, analyzed using qualitative content analysis, consists of the 
published remuneration statements and sustainability reports of 43 Finnish companies reporting according to the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) framework. Our results indicate that comprehensive sustainability remunera-
tion is still rare in Finnish large companies: long-term financial targets are implemented at most companies, but 
social or environmental targets were only reported by 7 companies (16%). We conclude that executive remu-
neration policies are still mainly concerned with financial targets and aligning the interests of executives and 
shareholders and ignoring other stakeholders. The dominance of the remuneration reporting by the local Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code (FCGC) over GRI reporting on remuneration highlights sustainability accounting as 
local practice and is a reason for the lack of fully transparent reporting about the criteria of sustainability 
remuneration. We conclude that sustainable executive remuneration and simultaneously lacking transparency of 
reporting on it do not support implementation of sustainability strategies in Finnish companies and may hinder 
the development towards genuine sustainability and shows that there is an important (missing) link between 
incentives and sustainability in business.   
1. Introduction 
99% percent of Finnish corporate directors see sustainability as an 
essential business issue (FIBS, 2017). Sustainability is defined by 
Elkington’s (2011) triple bottom line concept as three different areas 
that should be considered in business: economic, social and environ-
mental. The globally accepted Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
framework is largely based on the triple bottom line idea (Hale and Held, 
2011). Most large companies report on their sustainability (Journeault 
et al., 2021), but sustainability and executive remuneration are still 
rarely connected (Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil and LaGore, 2011). There 
may be several reasons for the situation. Sustainability targets are hard 
to quantify making it difficult to implement a sustainability remunera-
tion system in a transparent way. Social and environmental accounting 
☆ It was stated in the FCGC 2015, that its’ implementation promotes transparency of reporting, and that companies shall issue a ‘Remuneration Statement’, which is 
a consistent description of the remuneration of the directors and executives containing information about decision-making procedures concerning the remuneration, 
the most important principles regarding the remuneration and remuneration report, and on the remuneration paid during the previous financial period. But there 
were no requirements for the components, criteria or measurements to be disclosed. Statement shall be published in the corporate governance or investors section of 
the company website and in the Corporate Governance Statement.☆☆ The new FCGC 2020 includes many revisions on page 59 “If the remuneration policy includes 
variable remuneration components” the variable components in question must be determined and stated. The “short- and long-term incentive remuneration can have 
different grounds for determination”, such as company’s financial or profit performance criteria, corporate responsibility and non-financial performance measures, 
compliance with internal and external rules or an assessment of the personal performance of the person being remunerated. “The remuneration policy must report how 
the chosen grounds for determination promote the company’s business strategy and long-term financial success.” FCGC 2020 continues on page 65 that the company needs to 
report “the grounds for financial and non-financial performance as well as grounds concerning the company’s corporate responsibility. The report on the fulfilment of 
remuneration criteria can be drafted in such a way as to not publish commercially sensitive information of the company.” 
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techniques are developing fast (Hörisch et al., 2020) but the results of 
what drives sustainability are mixed (Bolourian et al., 2021). The use of 
sustainability remuneration is expected to increase (Keatinge and Eaton, 
2014) and provide stimulus for enhancing sustainability in companies 
(Hong et al., 2016) and society (Tamimi and Sebastianelli, 2017). The 
developments in sustainability-based remuneration and reporting are 
slow and lack extensive scientific research. In order to fill the gap in the 
scientific knowledge related to sustainability-related executive remu-
neration and transparent reporting on it and in order to support their 
better diffusion to practice, the purpose of this study is to find out how 
sustainability is connected to the executive remuneration of Finnish 
publicly listed companies’ disclosure. The originality of this study stems 
from the idea to examine the sustainable executive remuneration and 
the transparency of the reporting on it simultaneously, since we believe 
they form an intertwined challenge for sustainable development. 
The Finnish Corporate Governance Code (2015, hereafter FCGC) and 
the expectations related to the new FCGC version (in 2020) as well as the 
stock exchange practices standardize remuneration reporting in Finland, 
but separate sustainability reporting is still voluntary for most com-
panies. The leading global framework for sustainability reporting, the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) aims at standardizing reporting prac-
tices but there are still differences in the reporting on sensitive topics, 
and executive compensation. 
Earlier theory on incentive-based remuneration suggests that in-
centives are applied to achieve strategic goals in companies (Chen and 
Jermias, 2014). The strategic goals may include sustainability, not least 
because they may also improve company financial performance (Ameer 
and Othman, 2012). In order for executives to have incentives to pursue 
sustainable (social and environmental) targets as strongly as economic 
ones, one can assume, that they should be rewarded based accordingly 
on sustainability performance. It can be hypothesized that if the sus-
tainability targets are not linked with remuneration, sustainable stra-
tegic goals became not achieved. 
The triple bottom line of sustainability (Elkington, 2011), which 
combines the economic, environmental and social aspects of business, is 
attached to corporate sustainability reporting, but short-term financial 
performance and shareholder value creation have mainly dominated the 
way bonuses and other benefits are determined (Li and Wang, 2016). 
Traditional financial accounting offers suitable tools for evaluating 
conventional financial performance but evaluating social and environ-
mental targets is trickier, and may involve instrumental approaches to 
sustainability, even greenwashing in practice (Mahoney et al., 2013). 
Executive compensation is a central aspect of corporate governance 
and responsibility research (Walls et al., 2012) but the relationships 
between sustainability, transparency and remuneration are more 
scarcely studied topics. Explicit research focusing on transparency of the 
reporting on the sustainable executive compensation is practically 
non-existent (excluding Tamimi and Sebastianelli, 2017). 
It is a central to understand the role of stakeholders (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995) in studying sustainability reporting and executive 
remuneration. Identifying the relevant stakeholders (Hörisch et al., 
2020) and suitable ways of stakeholder involvement (Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2009a) remain central issues for firms in various business 
contexts. 
The purpose is this study is to increase the knowledge on 1) sus-
tainable executive remuneration and 2) to the transparency of the 
reporting on it. We do that in a Scandinavian context that is often 
thought as highly equal and sustainable context (PwC, 2016), and 
explore the relationship between remuneration incentives and sustain-
ability (long term financial, environmental and social) targets and the 
transparency of its reporting. The research questions are: 
● Do Finnish listed companies transparently report about sustainabil-
ity incentives in their executive remuneration?  
● Which aspects of the sustainability are considered in sustainability 
remuneration and to what extent?  
● What are the likely reasons of the limited usage of sustainability 
executive remuneration and lack of the transparency in the reporting 
on it? 
The research method of the study is qualitative. The sustainability, 
corporate governance and when necessary, annual reports published in 
2017 (reporting year 2016) by 43 Finnish listed companies were studied. 
The data was analyzed using the content analysis method discussed in 
more detail in section 3.2. 
2. Theory 
In the theoretical section, we present the key concepts of the study, 
sustainable executive remuneration and transparency of sustainable 
reporting and relevant earlier research on the topic of the study. We 
continue the conceptual discussion on sustainability and triple bottom 
line, as well as the role of stakeholders. This theoretical background 
offers a link between sustainable executive remuneration practice and 
transparent reporting on it, which we see as a key challenge for sus-
tainable business and development. 
2.1. Executive remuneration 
In Finland, the recommendation 24 of the FCGC (2015) stated that 
the objective of remuneration is to promote the long-term financial 
success and competitiveness of the company and the favorable devel-
opment of shareholder value. It added that remuneration must be based 
on predetermined and measurable performance and result criteria. Ac-
cording to it, remuneration may consist of fixed and variable salary and 
remuneration. It stated that the variable components of salary and 
remuneration may be based on long-term and/or short-term perfor-
mance and results. The financial and non-financial performance and 
result criteria, which must be measurable in a manner that is as unam-
biguous as possible, may be used as the basis for the remuneration. 
Executive compensation is a motivational tool (Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2009a) for getting executives to perform in a way that 
aligns their interests with the company and the interests of the share-
holders (Fabrizi et al., 2014). The structure of remuneration is important 
since appropriate incentives encourage an executive to perform well but 
poorly chosen incentives may have negative effects, like manipulation 
(Nordberg, 2011). 
A remuneration scheme may be based on results or company share 
performance, or on behavior (managerial efforts), and it may be 
distributed among groups or assigned directly to individuals (Fabrizi 
et al., 2014). The relation between pay and performance is complex, but 
evidence suggests that it is essential that the incentives are tied to 
strategy because misfit between strategy and compensation structure 
can negatively affect performance (Fabrizi et al., 2014). 
Remuneration is usually classified as either short- or long-term. 
Short-term objectives may help a company’s existing shareholders to 
gain higher returns on stocks sold because managers are encouraged to 
pursue actions that increase the stock price (Bolton et al., 2006). These 
actions might decrease the value of the company in the long term. 
Long-term remuneration schemes aim to affect managerial risk-taking 
and long-term focus (Core et al., 2003) by using equity-based remu-
neration (equity incentives) like stocks or stock options (Mahoney and 
Thorne, 2005). Different forms of controlling and rewarding the exec-
utives are needed to align the interests of various stakeholders (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2010). 
The stakeholder expectations can be mapped and incorporated into 
the incentive scheme design to fulfill stakeholder needs (Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2009a). Careful mapping of interests also decreases the 
possibility of unexpected conflicts among stakeholders. Creating shared 
value (Porter and Kramer, 2011), relates closely to stakeholders and 
sustainability so that corporate responsibility and profit maximization 
may be not two separate issues and cooperation with communities is 
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necessary for companies to succeed in the long-term. This 
win-win-oriented concept has received attention and has been com-
mended for its practical and strategic approach (Crane et al., 2014; 
Strand and Freeman, 2015). 
2.2. Sustainable executive remuneration 
Sustainability remuneration is defined in this study as remuneration 
based on long-term economic, social and environmental targets. Ac-
cording to this definition, a remuneration scheme fully based on finan-
cial measures might be seen to be sustainable if it had long-term focus 
but in this study remuneration must have aspects of at least two of these 
bottom lines to be considered sustainability-based. This means that it 
has to have either (at least one) social or environmental targets in 
addition to the financial targets if not both. 
The key components of management remuneration are fixed and 
variable pay. Variable pay is usually made up of bonuses, stock options 
and long-term equity incentives that are related to different targets 
(Nordberg, 2011), managerial effort, shareholder preferences and firm 
characteristics (Li and Wang, 2016). Incentives can be short-term or 
long-term by nature and the company-specific remuneration schemes 
are often determined by remuneration committees. 
According to earlier studies, sustainability-based incentives are still 
quite rare. The percentage of companies using sustainability incentives 
has been studied to vary from 33 to 39 percent (Keatinge and Eaton, 
2014; Maas and Rosendaal, 2016). There is some country specific evi-
dence that number of companies linking compensation and sustain-
ability has been growing. (Keatinge and Eaton, 2014). Sustainability 
targets appear to be more common in the dirty markets, such as the 
energy sector (Maas and Rosendaal, 2016). Other factors that may in-
crease the use of sustainability incentives are firm size, compensation 
committee independence, the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
committee, CSR sustainability index, and resource efficiency policy el-
ements (Abdelmotaal and Abdel-Kader, 2016). To provide executives 
with direct incentives for CSR is an effective tool to increase firm social 
performance (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2008, 2009a, 2009a). 
Executives may sometimes get bonuses for lucky incidents they have 
no control over or for risky actions that may even reduce company value 
in the long-term (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). Incentives may also be 
subject to manipulation (Goergen and Renneboog, 2011). Incentives 
improve performance and do not necessarily decrease intrinsic moti-
vation (Shaw and Gupta, 2015). Long-term incentive schemes have 
found to be the best motivators for company performance (Mehran, 
1995). Equity-based schemes enhance motivation to act in the com-
pany’s best interest (Core et al., 2003; Mahoney and Thorne, 2005). 
While incentive schemes are complex they tend to have a positive effect 
on motivation, and so sustainable remuneration should increase sus-
tainable performance (Hong et al., 2016). 
The effect of executive compensation on sustainability is studied, but 
with somehow conflicting results (Mahoney and Thorne, 2006). 
McGuire et al. (2003) find no significant relationship between 
compensation and sustainable (social) performance. On the contrary, 
Deckop et al. (2006) and Mahoney and Thorne (2005) found evidence of 
a positive relationship. Berrone and Mejia-Gomez (2009b) argued that 
incorporating environmental targets into a remuneration scheme can be 
symbolic but may help companies build legitimacy, which may lead to 
many intangible benefits. Environmental incentives encourage the CEO 
to monitor environmental performance (Hong et al., 2016). As far as we 
know, only Tamimi and Sebastianelli (2017) have examined the 
dilemma of sustainable executive compensation reporting transparency, 
and found that Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) based 
compensation increases ESG scores but while governance is well re-
ported in S&P500 companies, environmental issues are not. 
Canada and Australia are the frontrunners in adopting sustainability 
incentives. Additionally, in US a link between sustainability and 
compensation has been growing slightly in the past years, as well as in 
Norway, the Netherlands and Brazil. (Keatinge and Eaton, 2014). 
Scandinavian countries seem to be slow in adopting sustainability in-
centives (Maas and Rosendaal, 2016). Sustainability incentives may not 
be a panacea, but have been also criticized for manipulation and even 
window dressing (Kolk and Perego, 2014). 
2.3. Transparency in sustainability reporting, GRI and FCGC frameworks 
This study focuses not just on the use of sustainable executive 
remuneration, but also on the transparency of the reporting on it. We 
review the meaning and importance of the concept of transparency, and 
then move to the practical level of sustainability reporting, both using 
the leading framework, GRI, and the local FCGC from 2015 but 
including its recent 2020 developments. In the field of sustainability, 
transparency is an important concept, since it allows for stakeholders to 
monitor company performance and to obtain relevant information 
(DubbinkGraafland and van Liedekerke, 2008). Transparent reporting 
can benefit a company by distinguishing it from badly performing 
competitors, tempting consumers or enhance legitimacy. Transparency 
perceptions may be affected by the industry, stakeholder pressure or 
geographical region (Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero and Ruiz, 2014). In-
ternal factors such as country of origin (Bolourian et al., 2021), size and 
corporate culture can also have an effect on the extensiveness, quality, 
quantity and completeness of social and environmental reporting 
(Adams, 2017). Both internal and external factors can be crucial moti-
vators for transparency in sustainability reporting – or for window 
dressing in worst cases (Weil et al., 2006). 
Fifka and Drabble (2012) revealed that, concerning sustainability 
reporting, Finland seems to have a stronger focus on environmental is-
sues than the UK. Finnish companies also tend to use international 
standards as a basis for their reporting (PwC, 2016) revealed. Finnish 
sustainability landscape is dispersed, even if Finnish taxation records 
regarding income are largely public and despite the success in sustain-
ability rankings: In the Global 100 most sustainable companies listing of 
Corporate Knights, four Finnish companies were listed in 2017, and 
Nokia, Kesko and Neste were in the top 25 companies which shows 
dedication to sustainability in their strategy (Corporate Knights, 2017). 
Some organizations may be committed to sustainability reporting 
because they wish to integrate sustainability principles more strongly 
into their corporate strategy and enhance their sustainability perfor-
mance (Adams and McNicholas, 2007). Some want to eliminate infor-
mation asymmetries and enjoy the positive effects of being regarded as a 
“good citizen” (Mahoney et al., 2013), but some companies use sus-
tainability reporting mainly as a way to appear more responsible under 
considerable pressure from the general public (Marquis et al., 2016) and 
motives can also be changing, complex and intertwined (Länsiluoto and 
Järvenpää, 2008). Lack of resources, the profit imperative, lack of legal 
requirements, lack of knowledge and awareness, poor performance and 
the fear of bad publicity have all been cited as reasons for a company to 
not engage in sustainability reporting (Belal, 2011). The GRI framework 
has been seen as an answer to many of these challenges because of its 
standardized nature and wide recognizability (Hale and Held, 2011). 
From the point of view of this study, the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) is a central concept, since most of the studied firms applied is as 
their reporting framework. GRI is a framework that aims to integrate the 
environmental and social aspects of business into the financial reporting 
of companies. It acts as a global guideline for voluntary sustainability 
reporting and has been adopted by many corporations worldwide, 
although the GRI’s target of harmonized, easily accessible reports has 
not been fully realized (Hale and Held, 2011). 
The GRI is the most widely-adopted sustainability reporting guide-
line in the world (Buck and Reinhardt, 2016), applied in over 10000 
organizations worldwide (Global Reporting Initiative, 2016a,b). The 
adaption of the GRI varies between different business sectors (Alon-
so-Almeida et al., 2014). 
The guidelines applied during empirical study, introduced in 
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October 2016, were known as the “GRI Standards” that follow the G4 
guidelines of 2013. The thematic differences between the two guidelines 
were minor and the G4 was also in effect until July 2018. The reporting 
structure in the GRI Standards differs from the G4 guidelines. In Finland, 
Sustainability disclosure is not mandatory for most companies but over 
half of the companies in PWC (2016) used the GRI framework to do so. 
The number of companies applying the GRI has remained relatively 
stable in Finland. The Remuneration Policies of the GRI require com-
panies to disclose information on how the economic, social, environ-
mental and financial aspects of their business are related to the 
executives’ remuneration schemes. The GRI was criticized by Levy et al. 
(2010) who argued that data is not fully comparable because many 
guidelines require information that is difficult to standardize and 
quantify. 
3. Empirical study 
3.1. Empirical data 
The empirical data was gathered using the corporate governance and 
sustainability reports, and the 2016 annual reports of 43 well-known 
Finnish companies publicly listed in the Nasdaq Helsinki exchange, 
representing many industries, sizes and differing global focus. Total 
amount of Finnish listed companies was 112. The 43 companies were 
selected for this research based on the information available on the 
Sustainability Disclosure Database (SDD, see Global Reporting Initia-
tive, 2016) meaning that they applied the GRI framework G4 (issued in 
2013), even though two companies (Kesko and Metsä Board) already 
used the newer GRI Standards (issued 2016). This selection criteria 
simplified and standardized our analysis because public companies are 
mandated by stock exchange to disclose similar information. Further, 
the GRI reporting indicator G4-51 specifically required disclosing in-
formation regarding remuneration policy in relation to environmental, 
economic and social objectives (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013). 
Sample companies are presented in Table 1. 
As the research data was gathered from a selected number of Finnish 
companies, the study will not offer a comprehensive look at how 
sustainability-related remuneration is reported on in all listed com-
panies. The other limitation relates to comparability as the companies 
who use GRI-based reporting may do so in a way that differs from other 
companies in other contexts. Qualitative research by definition does not 
seek to be generalizable but is more interested in developing an un-
derstanding of a particular phenomenon (Myers, 2000). In this paper the 
focus is on how transparently the executive sustainability remuneration 
is reported in the Finnish context. 
3.2. Method 
The study employs qualitative approach, content analysis, which is 
defined as systemic, objective and quantitative analysis of message 
characteristics, and a tool for describing message characteristics and 
identifying relationships between them (Neuendorf, 2016, 1, 42). The 
aim is to find how the reports mention any of the triple bottom line 
concepts as the basis of remuneration and whether sustainability is 
mentioned either directly or indirectly. 
The validity and reliability of qualitative research are based on 
alleviating the bias stemming from the researcher’s preconceived no-
tions. It is based on trustworthiness and differs from validity in posi-
tivistic research tradition (Golafshani, 2015.). The validity and 
reliability approach of this study is to focus on elements of interpretation 
that can be read from the data and diminish the interpretation bias based 
on individual researcher’s own ideology by having three authors making 
the final interpretation. 
The data was analyzed in its own context, reflecting on the company 
characteristics, such as the importance of sustainability in the company 
strategy, and whether they play a role in how the remuneration 
incentives are determined. The evidence presented by previous studies 
on the topic was also used as a comparative framework and the same 
themes will be analyzed in a Finnish study sample. The data was 
structured based on the key characteristics of the data relevant to the 
research questions and input into tables that show the comparison be-
tween each company. 
The remuneration reports used were analyzed focusing on the 
remuneration policies and principles the companies chose to disclose 
instead of the quantitative data on annual remuneration paid for each 
specific executive. This was to determine the basis rather than the 
practice of the remuneration schemes and to gain an understanding of 
the underlying perspective and objectives. The sustainability reports 
were read throughout to find evidence on managerial responsibility and 
its link to rewardable sustainability targets. The GRI indices were also 
analyzed to see if the remuneration reporting indicators were reported 
on and how this was done at each company. 
3.3. Evaluation scale 
The companies were evaluated on their sustainability remuneration 
link based on a scale consisting of three categories, weak, moderate and 
strong. A weak link was interpreted if a company’s remuneration or 
sustainability reports did not explicitly reveal any indication to 
Table 1 
Sample companies.  
Finnish listed companies acknowledged by the SDD for using the GRI framework G4 or 
Standards 
Aktia G4 
Alma Media G4 


















Metsä Boarda Standards 
Neste G4 
Nokia G4 
Nokian Tyres G4 
Outokumpu G4 
Outotec G4 
PKC Group G4 
Raisio G4 
Ramirent G4 













YIT G4  
a Metsä Board reported as part of Metsä Group. 
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sustainability remuneration. A moderate link, on the other hand, 
required that the remuneration or sustainability reports used an explicit 
remuneration metric relating to sustainability. The word sustainability 
or any of its equivalents (such as responsibility) was not necessary to be 
used as some targets, such as safety, can be seen to be belong to multiple 
different categories. A strong link would have been used for cases where 
it was explicitly stated that a company’s remuneration policies are based 
on multiple comprehensive sustainability (or responsibility) metrics or a 
sustainability index determined and reported on in an equal manner 
compared to other remuneration targets. In addition, the key principles 
of executive remuneration would have needed to emphasize the role of 
sustainability. In practice, companies having any environmental or so-
cial targets became interpreted having at least moderate link. None of 
the companies reached to the level strong link. 
4. Results 
In chapter 4 we analyze the results in the following ways: First, we 
analyze the reported remuneration targets in general according to 
different bottom lines, financial, environmental and social in chapter 
4.1. According to that, we interpret whether their remuneration link was 
weak, moderate or strong. While there were only few cases of sustain-
able remuneration targets, we analyze some firms with more details. 
Then we move on analyzing the key considerations and principles of 
remuneration schemes in chapter 4.2. Similarly, here we warrant few 
more detailed analyses for some interesting cases, like two firms suc-
ceeded in the then recent Corporate Knights Report (2017) and three 
other cases with interesting details. 
4.1. Remuneration targets and sustainability remuneration link 
4.1.1. Overall analysis 
In this chapter we analyze the remuneration targets and sustain-
ability remuneration link. Only 7 out of the 43 companies studied (16%) 
had a sustainability remuneration link that was interpreted as moderate 
(presented in Table 2). They were Fortum, Kemira, Konecranes, Neste, 
Outokumpu, Sanoma and Stora Enso. All other companies had only a 
weak link. This is much lower than the averages of over 33 percent found 
in earlier research (Keatinge and Eaton, 2014; Maas and Rosendaal, 
2016). This suggests that holistic sustainability remuneration was rare in 
Finland. This is consistent with Maas and Rosendaal (2016) who claimed 
that Scandinavia is a late comer in this area. Most companies studied 
only showed a weak, almost non-existent link between sustainability 
targets and remuneration while even in the cases where a moderate link 
was present, it was established mostly only by safety targets. The 
moderate link of Stora Enso was based on an explicit mention of sus-
tainability as a determinant of performance. 
Out of the sustainability bottom lines, the financial aspect was 
clearly the most frequently used in Table 2. Companies had short- and 
long-term variable compensation schemes in place. However, they were 
often not based on any specific financial indicators, such as earnings per 
share, EBITDA, organic revenue growth, operative cash flow and total 
shareholder return compared to an index. 
The most important social target was employee safety. It was 
measured annually and was used as a determinant of annual bonuses. 
The weighting of safety targets compared to other targets was not 
mentioned but, in many cases, they were among a set of very few bonus 
indicators, signaling a high importance. Safety might be valued so high 
because its implications on the organization and its performance are 
very direct. It can also be measured easily. Employee satisfaction and the 
vaguer “people” were also seen as short-term determinants for in-
centives which may be interpreted as sustainability targets because they 
involve another stakeholder group and focus on social wellbeing. 
4.1.2. Company specific analysis 
Stora Enso was the only company in the sample to explicitly mention 
Table 2 
Sustainability targets.  
Company Financial targets in 
long-term schemes 





Aktia Net asset value (50%), 
combined commission 
and insurance net for 
group (50%) 
– – 
Alma Media Profitable growth, 
share value 
– – 
Amer Sports Group’s earnings 
before interest and 





Atria Group’s earnings per 
share (EPS) excluding 
extraordinary items 
– – 
Cargotec ROCE, total 
shareholder return 
– – 
Citycon Total shareholder 
return (TSR) (weight 
100%) 
– – 
Cramo Group’s earnings per 
Share (EPS) 
– – 
DNA Total shareholder 
return (TSR) compared 
to a peer group, 
cumulative cash flow 
– – 
Elisa Earnings per share 
(EPS), revenues of new 
business operations, 
other key targets 
– – 








Earnings per share 
(50%), relative total 
shareholder return 
measured relative to 
the European Utilities 
Group (50%) 
– Yes (safety is 
mentioned as a 
target) 










– Yes (Safety related 




Kesko Growth percentage of 
Group’s sales, basic 
earnings per share 
(EPS) excluding non- 
recurring items, and 
total shareholder return 














safety and people 
Lassila & 
Tikanoja 
Group’s EVA result – – 




Martela Personal results, 
financial performance 
of the entire Group and 
the unit 
– – 
(continued on next page) 
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that they have performance targets in their short-term incentive pro-
gram for management related to sustainability. In Stora Enso, a sus-
tainability and ethics committee has also been implemented years a few 
ago. This is noteworthy since Abdelmotaal and Abdel-Kader (2016) 
stated that the use of a CSR committee may increase the usage of sus-
tainability incentives. 
Environmental targets were not explicitly mentioned in any of the 
remuneration reports besides the overall sustainability mention of Stora 
Enso. In many of the companies’ sustainability reports, clear targets on 
emission reduction were established and could have been used as targets 
for environmental incentives. There is no clear Finnish benchmark for 
environmental remuneration, which may slow down the implementa-
tion of environmental targets in remuneration. Benchmarks, according 
to Kolk and Perego (2014), are crucial for sustainability remuneration 
scheme design. 
Some companies used personal targets as performance criteria but it 
is impossible to say whether these are related to sustainable targets. 
Some companies have employed a dedicated sustainability executive or 
an executive responsible for sustainability matters. The true nature of 
remuneration targets was not revealed based on the reporting alone. 
Some companies (such as Cargotec and DNA) mentioned sustain-
ability governance in their sustainability report but not indicated 
executive-level sustainability incentives. Most companies mentioned 
employee-level remuneration in their sustainability report and 
explained that considerable efforts had been made to bring sustain-
ability to the employee level. Significantly less information was dis-
closed on sustainability management and on governance structures. 
Six out of seven companies with the interpreted moderate sustain-
ability remuneration link were operating in the unsustainable industries, 
such as nuclear energy or paper production. The only exception to this 
was Sanoma whose main operational area is the media. This supports the 
evidence of previous research (Maas and Rosendaal, 2016) that com-
panies operating in unsustainable industries put more emphasis on their 
sustainability activities. The sustainability and remuneration link re-
ported in the Corporate Knights Global 100 (2017) for Neste and Nokia, 
was not clear based on their reports alone. Neste used safety as a 
short-term compensation determinant but Nokia did not mention any 
non-financial targets in their remuneration statement. 
Table 2 (continued ) 
Company Financial targets in 
long-term schemes 





Metso Net sales growth of the 
services business, 
return on capital 
employed (ROCE) 
before taxes, and 
earnings per share, 
total shareholder return 
– – 
Metsä Board Group’s equity ratio, 
development of return 
on capital employed 
(ROCE) and earnings 






comparable free cash 
flow (75%) total return 
of shares relative to the 
STOXX Europe 600 
Index (25%) 
– Safety as a short- 
term bonus 
determinant 
Nokia Annual net sales (50%), 
average annual 
earnings per share 
(50%) 
– – 
Nokian Tyres Group’s operating 




EBITDA, savings  Occupational 
safety 
Outotec Net profit and free cash 
flow 
– – 
PKC Group Cumulative revenue 
and EBITDA 
– – 
Raisio Total Shareholder 
Return (TSR), Group’s 
cumulative profit target 
(EBT, earnings before 
taxes) 
– – 
Ramirent Share ownership, 









Earnings per share 
(excluding items 
affecting 
comparability), and the 
development of digital 
and other new media 
sales, adjusted free cash 
flow 
– Employee 
satisfaction as a 
short-term target 
Sponda Group’s average ROCE, 
cumulative operational 
cash earnings per share, 
real estate sales 
– – 
Stockmann Group’s financial and 
other objectives related 














Technopolis Total shareholder 
return growth (50%) 
and the operating result 
(50%) 
– – 
Tieto Total Shareholder 
Return, strategic target 
related to growth and 
on Earnings per Share 
(EPS) 
– – 
Tikkurila Group’s Operative 
Earnings Before 
– –  
Table 2 (continued ) 
Company Financial targets in 
long-term schemes 








and net debt 
Tokmanni 
Group 
Achievement of the 
company’s profitability 






return, EBITDA targets 
– – 
Vaisala Development of 
Group’s profitability 
– – 
Valmet EBITA % and orders 
received growth of the 
services business 
– – 
Wärtsilä Share price 
development 
– – 
YIT Return on investment, 
Group’s cash flow, net 
debt, earnings per share 
– –  
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4.2. Key considerations and principles of remuneration schemes 
4.2.1. Overall analysis 
In Table 3 the prominent keywords depicting sustainability related 
considerations are highlighted. With his illustration, we try to validate 
our analysis by giving a clue for reader about the analyzed empirical 
material regarding the remuneration principles. 
The key principles of remuneration policies of the analyzed com-
panies were the alignment of shareholder and executive interests, retention 
of key personnel, long-term success and value increase of the company, as 
well as competitive compensation in the surrounding market. These key 
considerations revolved around very specific stakeholder groups, the 
executives and the shareholders, with very little regard to the other 
stakeholder groups usually considered in sustainability research, such as 
the environment or the surrounding community. Words sustainability 
and fairness both only appear twice in Table 3. 
Many companies claimed that their remuneration scheme was 
related to their strategy or the strategic targets, and that strategy in-
volves elements of sustainability, which would, in theory, link sustain-
ability to remuneration. In the light of this study, it is hard to distinguish 
whether such a link actually exists in practice and if there are elements 
of sustainability targets. 
4.2.2. Company specific analysis 
In the Corporate Knights Global 100 (2017) report it is claimed that 
Neste and Kesko have a link between their sustainability targets and 
remuneration. This study also confirmed that somehow by finding how 
the companies’ remuneration reports, show some evidence that the link 
between sustainability and remuneration has been considered. Neste is 
the only company to explicitly mention that encouraging value-based 
behavior, consideration of others, the environment and the surround-
ing community, is a key component of the remuneration principles. 
Nokia also stated that they regard sustainability and long-term success 
as key considerations in their remuneration policies, even though the 
remuneration report did not explicitly mention environmental or social 
principles. Neither of the companies reported on any concrete envi-
ronmental targets or social targets other than safety in their remunera-
tion reports. 
Cargotec was the only company out of the sample to mention in their 
key remuneration principles that they aim to balance the needs of both 
shareholders and employees. While employee-related factors were 
mentioned often as key principles, the balancing concept was unique to 
Cargotec’s reporting. Another relatively unique concept in the remu-
neration was Fortum’s sustainable business results proposition, which in 
theory, could have indicated an even higher commitment to sustain-
ability than moderate, but which was not realized in the remuneration 
targets in the form of concrete environmental or social targets. 
4.3. Short-term versus long-term focus 
4.3.1. Overall analysis 
There were some short-term social targets companies used, most 
commonly measures for employee safety. Whether this is a true sus-
tainability target, can be argued but this was the most common non- 
financial target companies reported on. It is interesting to note that 
the most common non-financial sustainability target was most 
commonly measured on an annual level because at least in theory, 
sustainability is concerned with longer time periods. Breaking up a 
longer target into shorter durations may be an effective way to achieve 
sustainability targets gradually. 
Many companies have a long-term incentive scheme in place, which 
is often based on the realization of long-term financial targets or share 
performance. This shows that companies are at least partially seeking 
long-term sustainable performance even if social and environmental 
aspects are lacking in this regard. Not all companies had a long-term 
incentive scheme in place, even for financial targets. It is also notable 
Table 3 
Key considerations and principles of remuneration schemes.  
Company Key considerations of executive remuneration (excluding non- 
monetary) 
Aktia Long-term strategy, company value increase, shareholder and 
management interest alignment, key employee retention 
Alma Media Shareholder and management interest alignment, company value 
increase, performance culture driver, key employee retention, 
competitive compensation 
Amer Sports Business success and employee attraction, motivation, 
rewarding and retention 
Atria Long-term financial success and competitiveness, shareholder 
value 
Cargotec Strategic and business plan alignment, performance culture 
driver, individual performance motivation, employee and 
shareholder need optimization, key employee retention, 
motivation and attraction 
Citycon Long-term financial success and competitiveness, shareholder 
value 
Cramo Employee attraction and engagement, financial success 
DNA Strategic, financial and operative development, personnel 
motivation and rewarding for financial results 
Elisa Shareholder and management interest alignment, company value 
increase, key employee retention, competitive compensation 
Finnair Company success, individual performance, key employee 
retention, shareholder and management interest alignment 
Fortum Performance culture driver, company, strategy and performance 
targets, individual performance, sustainability in business 
Huhtamäki Incentivizing and retaining key personnel 
Kemira Company and individual performance, key employee retention, 
shareholder and management interest alignment 
Kesko Company performance, shareholder and management interest 
alignment, key employee retention 
KONE Encouragement of long-term efforts by key personnel, 
shareholder value increase, key employee retention 
Konecranes High performance and commitment to business targets, 
competitiveness, long-term financial success, shareholder value 
Lassila & 
Tikanoja 
No explanation of key considerations provided 
Marimekko Competitiveness, long-term financial success, shareholder value 
increase, key employee commitment 
Martela No explanation of key considerations provided 
Metso Competitive salary and employee benefits, shareholder and 
management interest alignment, company value increase, 
commitment of management 
Metsä Board Fairness and competitive management compensation, successful 
and profitable implementation of strategy, encouragement to 
develop strategy, long-term benefit for the company 
Neste Performance driver, encouragement of value-based behavior and 
accountability by individuals and teams, fairness and 
transparency 
Nokia Attracting, retaining and motivating leaders, performance and 
behavioral drivers, alignment of management and shareholder 
interests, strategy, sustainability and long-term success 
Nokian Tyres Alignment of owners’ and key personnel’s interests, company 
value increase, key personnel retention 
Outokumpu Shareholder value, business strategy alignment, pay for 
performance, competitive salaries and total compensation 
Outotec Alignment of interests of Outotec, shareholders and employees, 
company’s operating performance in the short- and long-term, 
individual performance, attracting and retaining professionals, 
competitive compensation 
PKC Group Alignment of shareholder and key personnel interests, long-term 
company value increase, competitive compensation 
Raisio Competitive compensation, alignment of owners’ and key 
personnel’s interests, company value increase, key personnel 
retention 
Ramirent Alignment of shareholder and key personnel interests, company 
value increase, key personnel retention, competitive 
compensation 
Saga Furs No explanation of key considerations provided 
Sanoma No explanation of key considerations provided 
Sponda Alignment of key personnel and shareholder interests, company 
value increase, key personnel retention, competitive 
compensation 
Stockmann Incentive and commitment scheme for management 
Stora Enso 
(continued on next page) 
H. Hartikainen et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Journal of Cleaner Production 324 (2021) 129224
8
that none of the long-term plans consisted of any explicit non-financial 
targets. 
The use of short-term sustainability incentives is contradictory to the 
basic idea of sustainability matters being long-term by nature but may 
be related to the fast changes in operational targets that these executives 
have to implement on a short-term basis. In other words, the average 
duration of an executive tenure might be shorter than the timespan of 
achieving a social or environmental target. Most companies in this study 
already have some measurable targets for major environmental and 
social goals, which could perhaps be later used in remuneration as well. 
4.3.2. Company specific analysis 
Incentives related to personal (and possibly sustainability-related) 
targets were often only considered in the short-term schemes. As an 
example, the weighting for personal strategic targets at Nokia was 20% 
of short-term incentives but the long-term incentives were fully tied to 
net sales and earnings per share. The same goes for Stora Enso, whose 
short-term incentives had a 30% weighting on individual targets but on 
the long-term incentive schemes, only the group EVA was considered. 
4.4. FCGC versus GRI executive remuneration reporting guidelines 
Only 18 (42%) of the 43 companies studied in this sample chose to 
report on remuneration in their GRI reporting (presented in Table 4), 
even though remuneration belongs to the standard disclosures and is not 
up for materiality assessment. This severely decreased GRI compliance 
and transparency. Some companies choose to ignore the GRI executive 
remuneration guidelines altogether but most companies simply used a 
direct link to the remuneration statement and report on remuneration 
using the FCGC instead of the requirements of the individual GRI in-
dicators. This can be one of the factors explaining why social and 
environmental targets are so rarely reported on, as the GRI requirement 
of disclosing how the three bottom lines are related to the remuneration 
schemes are simply disregarded in the reporting. 
GRI specifically required to disclose how the social, environmental 
and financial aspects of their business are related to the remuneration 
schemes. This was explicitly reported on at only three (7%) of the 
studied companies (DNA, Metso, PKC Group), which makes determining 
the degree of sustainability in the remuneration schemes very difficult. 
Stakeholder involvement in the remuneration determination process 
was another requirement from the GRI, which was not explained in most 
remuneration reporting. This could be because such involvement did not 
exist or companies do not report on it. We think that the duality of the 
requirements (FCGC and GRI) likely added to the confusion. 
The FCGC (2015) had an established position in the Finnish market 
as the leading standard disclosure policy for publicly listed companies. 
Most companies followed it, which can be seen both as a positive and a 
negative. Companies are required to disclose information on the 
amounts of remuneration, as well as on the deciding and supervising 
bodies. As pointed out in the theoretical section, the code (2015 version) 
Table 3 (continued ) 
Company Key considerations of executive remuneration (excluding non- 
monetary) 
Motivates, encouraging, attracting and retaining employees of 
the highest caliber 
Technopolis Implementation of company strategy, alignment of shareholder 
and key personnel interests, company value increase, key 
personnel retention 
Tieto Alignment of shareholder and key employee interests, long-term 
company value increase 
Tikkurila Commitment and motivation of key personnel 
Tokmanni 
Group 
No explanation of key considerations provided 
UPM-Kymmene Alignment of director and shareholder interests, long-term 
financial success, competitiveness, shareholder value increase 
Vaisala Achievement of financial and operational targets, 
competitiveness 
Valmet Achievement of financial and operational targets, high 
performance, competitiveness, alignment of key executive and 
shareholder interests, company value increase 
Wärtsilä Alignment of shareholder and key personnel interests, long-term 
equity-related interest creation, long-term performance, key 
personnel retention 
YIT Good performance, motivating personnel, commitment of the 
management and employees to the company objectives  
Table 4 
FCGC versus GRI executive remuneration reporting guidelines.  










Aktia YES NO NO 
Alma Media YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Amer Sports YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Atria YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Cargotec YES NO NO 
Citycon YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Cramo YES NO NO 
DNA YES YES YES (Both) 
Elisa YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Finnair YES NO NO 
Fortum YES NO NO 
Huhtamäki YES NO NO 
Kemira YES NO NO 
Kesko YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
KONE YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Konecranes YES NO NO 
Lassila & 
Tikanoja 
YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Marimekko YES NO NO 
Martela YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Metso YES YES YES (Both) 
Metsä Board YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Neste YES NO NO 
Nokia YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Nokian Tyres YES NO NO 
Outokumpu YES NO NO 
Outotec YES NO NO 
PKC Group YES YES YES (Both) 
Raisio YES NO NO 
Ramirent YES NO NO 
Saga Furs YES NO NO 
Sanoma YES NO NO 
Sponda YES YES NO 
Stockmann YES NO NO 
Stora Enso YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Technopolis YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
Tieto YES NO NO 
Tikkurila YES NO NO 
Tokmanni 
Group 
YES NO NO 
UPM- 
Kymmene 
YES NO NO 
Vaisala YES NO NO 
Valmet YES NO NO 
Wärtsilä YES YES YES (Mainly 
FCGC) 
YIT YES NO NO 
Metsä Board reported as part of Metsä Group. 
Compliance with the older FCGC due to differing financial year. 
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did not explicitly require companies to disclose exact targets or mea-
sures in their remuneration schemes, only the central remuneration 
principles. The focus was more on the technicality of how remuneration 
is determined and not on what the basis for it truly is. Additionally, as 
with most non-sustainability reporting guidelines the reporting princi-
ples had a strict focus on financial performance. 
Companies are usually not willing to disclose sensitive business in-
formation, resulting in the analyzed lack of transparency. The users of 
the reports were given little information about how the remuneration is 
determined in terms of focus areas, measures or weighting. While some 
companies studied were open about their weightings and policies, some 
disclosed only the minimum information using vague terms such as 
“based on financial performance” and “based on company perfor-
mance”. Few companies (DNA, Metso, PKC Group) were more trans-
parent since they reported not incorporating sustainability into their 
remuneration schemes. This openness created a realistic picture of their 
sustainability. This is also a required disclosure in the GRI framework. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Theoretical results 
Executive incentives and sustainability are popular topics in the 
business but few companies showed any direct link between the two: 
there was not hardly any link between them or it was not disclosed. The 
lack of such relation might suggest how companies had implemented 
sustainable-driven strategies poorly and did not align sustainability to 
genuine organizational action. During the contemporary “zeitgeist” of 
sustainability, it might be expected that executives were also rewarded 
based on sustainability-related targets. We understand that sustain-
ability remuneration targets, like any other targets, can be subject to 
measurement problems and managerial opportunism. Honest reporting 
on sustainability might help create more transparency and, moreover, 
differentiate companies positively from their competitors (Mahoney 
et al., 2013). 
There is a lack of qualitative studies on sustainable executive 
remuneration and transparency of remuneration disclosure. The earlier 
results on executive remuneration and sustainability show that direct 
incentives for CSR increase company sustainability (Hong et al., 2016) 
but there is little research on both remuneration and transparency of 
remuneration reporting, only the indication that environmental items 
are not reported in a transparent way (Tamimi and Sebastianelli, 2017). 
We contribute to this research gap by showing the rareness of trans-
parent environmental and social remuneration practices and reporting 
in Finnish context with few apparent links to corporate sustainability. 
This study focused on the executive remuneration and sustainability 
reporting of 43 Finnish publicly listed companies. The company remu-
neration and sustainability reports from 2016 were studied from the 
publicly available material. The results show that most Finnish corpo-
rate reporting demonstrated only a weak, almost non-existent link be-
tween sustainability and remuneration. Only 16 percent of the 
companies showed a moderate link between sustainability and remu-
neration. Even at best, remuneration was mostly linked to short-term 
safety targets, which might be considered social targets. Environ-
mental targets were not explicitly mentioned in any of the companies’ 
reporting apart from a vague “sustainability” target used by Stora Enso 
and hardly any concrete sustainability performance measures were 
disclosed. 
42 percent of the companies studied completed the reports according 
to the GRI remuneration guidelines in addition to the remuneration 
disclosure required by the FCGC of 2015. The contradiction of what is 
required by which framework seemed to confuse companies as only 7% 
complied with the GRI requirement of disclosing what social, environ-
mental and financial targets they included in their remuneration 
schemes. This confusion suggests that remuneration and sustainability 
topics still remained detached at most Finnish publicly listed companies. 
The dominance of the remuneration reporting by the local FCGC 2015 
(applied in all 43 companies) over GRI reporting suggests that sustain-
ability reporting and triple bottom line are locally interpreted practices 
and companies tend to choose the more allowing option, if possible. This 
finding confirms and contributes to the expectations of Bolourian et al. 
(2021) that contextual factors affect CSR performance. 
Many large Finnish companies are listed on the Dow Jones Sustain-
ability Index, which indicates their strong commitment to sustainability 
targets. This commitment did not seem to cover sustainability remu-
neration. E.g. Nokia was chosen to be the 18th most sustainable com-
pany in the world (Corporate Knights, 2017) but its remuneration policy 
was reported almost exclusively on achieving maximum shareholder 
profit. One could argue this to be a result of Finnish legislation obli-
gating companies to prioritize shareholder value (Limited Liability 
Companies Act 624/2006). The triple bottom line approach (Elkington, 
2011) notes that sustainability and economics are not necessarily de-
tached in the long term and sustainable remuneration targets may 
support not just sustainable, but also long-term financial performance. 
The reviewed executive compensation literature highlighted the 
importance of aligning the interests of executives and shareholders but 
other stakeholders were less considered. The interests of different 
stakeholder groups may conflict. Perhaps sustainability executive 
compensation has not been widely implemented in Finland because of 
the complex stakeholder interests involved (Länsiluoto and Järvenpää, 
2008), lack of good examples (Kolk and Perego, 2014) and because of 
the oftentimes abstract nature of the sustainability. 
5.2. Practical implications 
As a practical implication of the study, companies should set con-
crete targets for sustainability more frequently and take an external 
body to assess their actual progress. Sustainability indices could offer a 
way for companies to track better their sustainable performance, and 
could be suggested, based on the results of the study. Comparable 
indices and their underlying sustainability assessments could provide, at 
least ideally, a benchmark for sustainability performance. This is not 
possible if companies solely rely on their individual targets and sus-
tainability scorecards. 
The core meaning of sustainability for companies seems to vary ac-
cording to national guidelines, locally and across industry sectors. A 
common and standardized framework for all firms across contexts and 
cultures is taking its first steps but the exact measures used for remu-
neration need local and field-level adjustments and attention from 
stakeholders. The steps ahead (with GRI) give focus and benefit a wide 
range of stakeholders in the long term if the company-specific core el-
ements of sustainability and the set targets are presented transparently 
in company reporting, allowing judging triple bottom line performance. 
We suggest that wide stakeholder involvement in the remuneration 
committee is beneficial in order to make the remuneration schemes 
more inclusive and less vulnerable to manipulation (look also Hörisch 
et al., 2020). In the long term, sustainability, transparency and profit-
ability can be aligned. 
What topics will be considered material and disclosed in reports can 
differ significantly between companies, suggesting the need for under-
standing both local and global reporting standards, influences and 
stakeholders of sustainability issues. A change in local or global guide-
lines temporarily makes it difficult for companies and investors to apply 
them in a consistent way, and there can be conflicting guidelines. The 
FCGC 2015 required a company to publish a separate remuneration 
statement but at the same time the GRI Standards incorporate much of 
the information into one report. 
According to earlier literature (Mahoney et al., 2013), companies 
who reward their executives according to sustainability goals, would 
disclose it to differentiate themselves and make themselves seen in a 
favorable light. The FCGC and the GRI Standards have a different 
approach to stakeholder inclusion, and the FCGC was the more widely 
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recognized remuneration reporting guideline in Finland. A harmonized 
and explicit sustainability incentive scheme could motivate top man-
agers towards clear sustainability goals, worth of reporting. We put 
much expectations on the new FCGC 2020, which requires transparent 
disclosure of the criteria for executive compensation, and speaks openly 
about the sustainability as a firm’s strategic target. 
6. Conclusions 
We contribute to the earlier literature on transparency and sustain-
ability of the executive remuneration by showing simultaneously that 
sustainable executive remuneration was still rare and reported in a non- 
transparent way among Finnish listed companies. Long-term financial 
targets, like equity incentives, were implemented at most companies but 
social or environmental targets were only reported in few (16%) com-
panies. We conclude, that executive remuneration policies were still 
mainly focusing on aligning the interests of executives and shareholders, 
while largely ignoring other stakeholders. We interpret, that the domi-
nance of the remuneration reporting by the local FCGC 2015 over GRI 
standard was one main reason to both the observed scarce sustainability 
remuneration and to the lacking remuneration criteria disclosure, which 
lowers transparency. In reporting, sustainability or fairness were rarely 
explicitly mentioned as a basis for remuneration (see Table 2) and 
economic, shareholder value related aspects of the triple bottom line, 
clearly dominated. This signifies that executive remuneration schemes 
supported transparency or sustainable strategy implementation only in a 
limited way. This indicates that Finnish companies’ sustainability has 
still a long way ahead to reach its full potential in the area of executive 
compensation. 
As a managerial implication the sustainability remuneration and its 
transparent reporting calls for attention as we expect sustainability is-
sues to grow their importance among stakeholders in the future. Further, 
the local practices need to be monitored closely by managers and 
stakeholders. In Finland, the new FCGC 2020 brings local reporting 
closer to GRI and such harmonization suggests a strengthening link 
between targets, sustainable executive remuneration and transparent 
disclosure on it. 
Future research should look at how different companies perceive, 
make sense and define sustainability in their sustainability remunera-
tion and reporting on it. In this study, the concept varied significantly by 
company, which makes the sustainability actions challenging to be 
compared, benchmarked and rated. Another topic worth studying is the 
actual company remuneration practices against their reports. Further 
research is needed regarding if sustainable executive compensation 
improves different aspects of performance at companies. We also call for 
studies on stakeholder views on CSR, local interpretations of sustain-
ability and sustainability incentives, and on reporting practices that 
continuously evolve both globally and locally. 
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